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**Civil-Military Relations in
Germany:
Past, Present and Future**

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Summary

Modern societies are still living in an unsafe world which implies that societies and their states are in need of the military, in need of maintaining armed forces and in need of providing them with sufficient resources. Yet, the military is a double-edged sword; it can be used both for good and evil. This ambivalence is the reason why civil-military relations have been, are and will remain at the heart of military sociological research, particularly in democratic societies. In democracies, there is a basic feeling that the existence of the military requires institutions for the political and democratic control of the armed forces in order to prevent an insularization of the military from society and to prevent the armed forces from turning into a state within the state.

The paper aims at sketching the development of civil-military relations in the second half of the 20th century and at assessing the present and the future state of the civil-military gap in Germany. In the beginning, however, the paper deals with international change and societal change and their impact on the military world. By doing so, the overall pattern which figures as the context for the renewed turbulence in civil-military relations is described.

In the historical part of the paper it is outlined that both the establishment and the character of the German armed forces with the prominent characteristics of the politically innovative concept of *Innere Führung* and the ideal of a citizen in uniform cannot be understood without the reference to history and without the framework of the enfolding Cold War. This section also traces the development of civil-military relations up to the present. It highlights societal impulses for the democratization of the Bundeswehr in the 1960s and 1970s, civil-military alienation ensuing from NATO's strategic change to 'Flexible Response'

Kurzfassung

Moderne Gesellschaften leben weiterhin in einer unsicheren Welt. Dies bedeutet, dass Gesellschaften und Staaten auch künftig der Streitkräfte bedürfen, dass sie sie auszustatten und zu finanzieren haben. Gleichwohl bleibt das Militär ein zweischneidiges Schwert; es kann für ‚gute‘ wie für ‚schlechte‘ Ziele eingesetzt werden. Diese Ambivalenz ist der Grund dafür, dass – zumal in demokratischen Gesellschaften – die Untersuchung des zivil-militärischen Verhältnisses im Zentrum militärsoziologischer Forschung war, ist und bleibt. In Demokratien ist der Eindruck weit verbreitet, dass die Existenz von Streitkräften Institutionen zu ihrer politischen und demokratischen Kontrolle verlangt, um so die Kluft zwischen der zivilen Gesellschaft und den Streitkräften nicht zu groß werden zu lassen.

Absicht dieses Arbeitspapierses ist es, die Entwicklung des zivil-militärischen Verhältnisses in Deutschland in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zu skizzieren und den gegenwärtigen und vielleicht auch absehbaren Zustand dieses Verhältnisses zu bestimmen. Zuvor werden jedoch nationale wie internationale Veränderungsprozesse in ihrer Auswirkung auf das Militär dargelegt, um so den Kontext für die neuerliche Turbulenz im zivil-militärischen Verhältnis einzufangen.

In dem geschichtlichen Rückblick wird betont, dass sowohl die Entstehung wie auch das Wesen der Bundeswehr mit ihren hervorstechenden Merkmalen des politisch innovativen Konzepts der Inneren Führung und dem Ideal des Soldaten in Uniform ohne die historische Perspektive und ohne den sich entfaltenden Ost-West-Konflikt nicht zu verstehen ist. Dieser Abschnitt zeichnet sodann die Entwicklung des zivil-militärischen Verhältnisses bis in die Gegenwart hinein nach. Er hebt die gesellschaftlichen Demokratisierungsimpulse

in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the impact of the eroding East-West-conflict and of the non-traditional military challenges following the peacekeeping and peaceenforcement missions of the 1990s on civil-military relations.

In the following section, the present state of the civil-military gap in Germany is evaluated by resorting to the SOWI annual population surveys and by extracting from the data two groups, the civilian and the military segment. The analysis shows a broad and distinctive overlap of the attitudes of the civilian and the military population in Germany on a wide range of issues belonging to the fields of foreign policy, things military and domestic politics. Further and closer inspection reveals remarkable differences between the civilian and the military population. These expressions of the civil-military gap proved to be less intense in the field of domestic politics, but more pronounced in issues of foreign policy and things military.

Germany has witnessed a transition from armed forces for peace which were never really deployed in missions requiring them to really fight to new missions involving an active engagement and participation of the Bundeswehr. Opposition and resistance towards these measures in society are surprisingly limited. The overall image of and trust in the Bundeswehr is substantial. Yet, the data indicate that indifference vis-à-vis the military characterizes public opinion. The paper closes by hypothesizing that civil-military relations will become a more strained, although not really contested relationship in the future.

der 60er und 70er Jahre hervor, die Entfremdung zwischen Militär und Gesellschaft im Gefolge des Wechsels der NATO-Strategie hin zu ‚Flexible Response‘ in den späten 70er und frühen 80er Jahren und den Einfluss des sich auflösenden Ost-West-Konflikts und die nicht-traditionalen Rollenanforderungen durch die Peacekeeping- und Peaceenforcement-Operationen der 90er Jahre auf das Verhältnis zwischen Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft.

Anschließend erfolgt eine Analyse des gegenwärtigen Zustandes der zivil-militärischen Kluft in Deutschland unter Rückgriff auf die jährlichen SOWI-Bevölkerungsumfragen, aus denen sich zwei Gruppen, ein ziviles und ein militärisches Segment, herausfiltern lassen. Sie zeigt zunächst eine recht breite Übereinstimmung in den Meinungen der beiden Gruppen zu Themen aus den Bereichen Außenpolitik, Militärpolitik und Innenpolitik. Gleichzeitig gelingt indes die Herausarbeitung von eindrucklichen Unterschieden zwischen den beiden Gruppen, wobei diese auf dem Gebiet der Innenpolitik weniger stark ausgeprägt sind als auf den Gebieten der Außen- und Militärpolitik.

Deutschland ist Zeuge geworden eines Übergangs von Friedensstreitkräften, die niemals in echten Kampfmissionen eingesetzt waren, hin zu solchen Streitkräften, denen in militärischen Operationen eine aktive militärische Beteiligung abverlangt wird. Widerstand gegen diese Entwicklung ist derzeit überraschend begrenzt, und die allgemeine Wertschätzung für die Bundeswehr bewegt sich auf sehr hohem Niveau. Gleichwohl spricht aus den Daten eine gesellschaftliche Haltung der Indifferenz gegenüber den Streitkräften. Der Beitrag schließt mit der Hypothese, dass das zivil-militärische Verhältnis in Deutschland künftig (wieder) größeren Belastungen ausgesetzt sein wird, diese aber nicht einen essenziell-erschütternden Umfang annehmen werden.

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1 Introduction

Civil-military relations have been, are and will remain at the heart of military sociological research. This is particularly true for democratic societies. The reason why civil-military relations are on center-stage in the discipline is due to the inherently ambivalent character of armed forces. In the long history of the military there have been numerous cases in which the armed forces acted in non- or even anti-democratic ways. There have been cases in which the military was an instrument to overthrow democratic political regimes as can be seen when looking at some Latin American, African, Asian and even Western countries and the number of attempted or successful coup d'états in these regions. On the other hand there have been cases in which the military was crucial in defending a democracy against its attackers or even served as a supporter of a transition to democracy. A prominent example would be the Western powers and especially the United States that brought democracy to Germany after World War II, an endeavor in which the armed forces were of crucial importance.

Thus, in essence, the military is a double-edged sword. And it is precisely this ambivalent character of the military which is at the root of why the relationship between the armed forces and society are of major disciplinary and also societal and political concern (cf. Kümmel/von Bredow 2000). This is even more so since in the 1980s and especially after the end of the East-West-conflict there has taken place an almost world-wide process towards the liberalization and even the democratization of societies and political systems. These very democratization processes have persuaded the protagonists of the democratic-peace theory (cf. Russett 1993) to identify a certain trend towards a military-free world. In such a world, civil-military relations (and the analysis of them) become obsolete. Contrary to these assumptions, however, in the end the world remains a place of fundamental insecurity. Or, as Raymond Aron once put it, 'mankind has always lived dangerously'. This diagnosis is corroborated by several wars which have been conducted during the 1990s. Be it the Gulf War, the bloodshed on the Balkans, the war in the Congo or the currently precarious situations in the Near East: all of them seem to point to the ongoing validity of Aron's words, at least for the foreseeable future. This implies, in turn, that

societies and their states are still in need of the military, in need of maintaining armed forces and in need of providing them with sufficient resources.

In democracies, in particular, there is a basic feeling that the existence of the military requires institutions for the political and democratic control of the armed forces in order to prevent an insularization of the military from society and to prevent the armed forces from turning into a state within the state. To take this issue of the civic and civilian or, more precisely, democratic control of the military seriously is a major task for any given democratic government as well as for the society at large. The lively, intense and rich debate on the civil-military culture gap in the United States of America (and particularly in the thoroughly impressive *Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society* conducted by the *Triangle Institute for Security Studies, TISS*) as well as in several other countries is proof of the willingness of, at least, military sociology as a discipline to meet this challenge and to ensure that the armed forces do not become a threat to the democratic political system.

In addition, this discourse resonates with a theme of classical sociology, namely the debate on the ‘incompatibility’ of advanced industrial societies and the military and the use of military force which goes back to Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and others (cf. Wachtler 1983). Quite recently, Wolfgang Vogt (1983, 1986, 1988) has radicalized this idea and developed the ideal-type constructs of *civilian logic* and *military logic* which are radically different from one another and increasingly exclude one another. It should be noted right from the beginning, that I do not share his assumptions. Instead, I propose that in the empirical social and political reality these different logics do not exist in pure, but in mixed forms (von Bredow 1995: 22). In the following I will try to view the findings of the TISS-project in the light of civil-military relations in Germany. Before doing so, however, I will briefly sketch the overall pattern which figures as the context for the renewed turbulence in civil-military relations.

2 Why Civil-Military Relations Recently Turned Turbulent

In recent years, civil-military relations all across the globe seem to have entered into an era of turbulence challenging the established patterns of civil-military relations of the past. This new turbulence is aptly described in the words of Don Snider and Miranda Carlton-Carew and can be traced back to four trends which are „potentially responsible for strains in civil-military relations: (a) changes in the international system (...); (b) the rapid drawdown of the military; (c) domestic demands on the military and society’s cultural imperatives; and (d) the increased role of nontraditional missions for the military.“ (Snider/Carlton-Carew 1995 as cited in Sarkesian/Connor 1999: 81) I share this approach with Snider/Carlton-Carew to a certain extent because it helps clarifying the whole picture by distinguishing several spheres and dimensions. Basically, it is developments in the international and the national spheres that impact on the armed forces. I will start with the international and national dimensions of change and then move on to their repercussions in the military world.

2.1 International Change

The international climate for most parts of the 20th century was shaped by the East-West-conflict. The ideological dimensions of this bipolar conflict formation – the antagonistic differences between the respective models of society – came into being in the 19th century. Until the First World War they were constrained to the sphere of domestic politics of various states marking an intra-state conflict. In 1917, then, with the Russian Revolution and the creation of the Soviet Union, these ideological differences entered the international arena and became one inter-state conflict among a number of others. This lasted until the end of the Second World War. From then on, however, it became a structural conflict dominating international politics for a substantial period of time in which several phases can be distinguished. The first phase is adequately termed the Cold War and came to an end in the early 1960s. The years 1963 and 1975, then, constitute the next phase of the East-West-confrontation marked by an antagonistic cooperation and a considerable reduction of tensions between the two superpowers (*detente*). Since the conflict could only be tamed, not

overcome, the armaments' race endured. Therefore, the last phase of the East-West-conflict, from 1975–1989, was marked by an oscillation between aggravation and mitigation (cf. Czempiel 1991).

1989, then, marked the end of the East-West-conflict. Indeed, this amounted to a ceasure in international relations since the Second World War. The implosion of the Soviet Union and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet empire fundamentally changed the world political macro-constellation. The rather clear-cut and straightforward structure of international politics as a result of the East-West-conflict has given way to the world after, i. e. to a much more messy world order (Nye 1992) with regions and zones of security of different degree and intensity. In this world order, there is no single structural conflict that shapes almost all the other conflict formations in the international system as the East-West-conflict has done up to 1989. Instead, there is a whole bunch of conflicts which sometimes overlap and reinforce each other. To a substantial degree, these conflicts do not resemble the conflicts of the past where states were fighting each other. By contrast, conflicts in the emerging world order increasingly stem from internal rifts within states between different groups of society and from state structures falling apart (Migdal 1988; Zartmann 1995; Waldmann 1997).

In a sense, then, it might be argued that the world for most of its parts has not become a safer place. In contrast to hopes of a benign, pleasant, harmonious, peaceful and prosperous world, possibly governed by a much more powerful United Nations (UN), and in contrast to the democratic and market economic triumphalism in the wake of Francis Fukuyama's (1992) well-known proposition of an end of history, the world witnessed the persistence of military conflicts, the unilateral decision over and the ongoing use of military means as well as the continued spending of substantial financial resources on armament's production, weapons procurement and arms' acquisition. Although there was a reduction of armed forces in quite a few countries and although armament expenditures showed signs of decrease, in the end, the hopes for a peace dividend were dashed. Instead, armies were to be maintained.

The end of the East-West-conflict occurred in a period of time fundamentally characterized by globalization, a term which has become a 'buzz-word' in politics and political science (see Waters 1996; Sjolander 1996). It may be characterized as follows:

- (1) Globalization is the prime mover in international relations. It is not an even, but an asymmetrical process since the costs and benefits of globalization are distributed unevenly between states, between societies, but also within them. As a result, there is opposition towards globalization, as for example expressed in fragmentation of various (political, economic, cultural, religious, ethno-national) brands.
- (2) Globalization is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. It takes place in the fields of the economy, the financial system, in the ecosphere, in communication, in demographics, and in security and military affairs. Across these fields, the basic joint characteristic is debordering or transbordering, i. e. the transgression of territorial boundaries.
- (3) Globalization means an increase in trans- and interactions between states and between members of its societies leading to what Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., (1977) termed complex interdependence. Although globalization and the density of interdependence varies across the world because of different interdependence costs and benefits and because of different degrees of interdependence susceptibility and interdependence vulnerability, the global arena increasingly becomes the focus and framework of social actions for all societies, but, of course, to varying degrees. This implies that the security of a given country can be influenced and threatened by events and developments in far away places. This means, in turn, that the security policies of each country in the world have to take the global aspects of security into consideration. Security, in most cases, cannot be established by focusing on the near abroad alone.

2.2 Change in the National Context

Armed forces are armed forces of a specific political system and of a specific society at a specific point in time. The military is thus operating in a given national context. For the West, i. e. broadly speaking the members of the OECD plus some newly industrializing countries, the development within (nation-)states and their societies can be subsumed under the headings of social change and value change. They strongly influence the life of the people, the life of the soldiers and the conditions for the operation of social institutions (see also van Doorn 1975). Therefore, armed forces are affected by the developments and processes going on in the society at large. Here, several factors come into play although, of course, to different degrees in the various countries.

A first attempt to grasp social change and development has been put forward by Ronald Inglehart (1977) in his seminal study on the silent revolution. In this book, Inglehart argues that in modern societies a shift is perceptible from materialistic to postmaterialistic attitudes and value orientations. In opposition to the traditional emphasis on material security and well-being, attitudes and values have emerged that place emphasis on participation, aesthetics and self-fulfillment. Living a good life in a healthy (ecologically safe) environment is deemed desirable by significant and growing parts of society.

As classical sociological thinkers – among them, e. g., Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies – have shown in their work, individualization is a central feature in the transition from traditional to modern society. Talcott Parsons has put this in the phrase of institutional individualism which he viewed as a structural characteristic of modern social systems (Honneth 1995: 21). In advanced societies, this discussion on the atomization and individualization of society has become more intense in the last decade. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986) has taken up these thoughts and developed a more radical perspective. According to him, the process of individualization is but in its very beginnings and will gain much more importance and thus social impact in the decades to come. The individual is forced to put itself center stage in conceptualizing its life and dealing with living conditions fundamentally characterized by risks. In the risk society as outlined by Beck the

vagaries and vicissitudes of life have to be shouldered by individuals who have lost the social safety net provided by either the family or by relatives or by the other members of society.

A correlated phenomenon to this move to postmaterialism is the emergence of what Gerhard Schulze (1992) calls the 'sensational society' (*Erlebnisgesellschaft*). Taking up cultural sociological analyses of Georg Simmel and notions of Arnold Gehlen, he starts from the same economic constraints and processes as Beck or Inglehart and he bases his analysis on the substantial increase of decisional leeways, of the opportunity set for conceptualizing and living one's life. This is due to the shift from an overwhelming socio-economic leverage on decision-making processes of the individual to an increased socio-economic security for a mounting number of people. These people, in turn, increasingly base their decisions on questions of alternatives of action on individual longings, wishes, likings and preferences. In the end, it is decision-making based on personal aesthetic preferences. As a result, however, the individual becomes an inward-oriented, inward-looking human being whose central impulse is the search for sensation, i. e. for an aesthetics of existence. Accordingly, Schulze diagnoses a trend among the younger generation towards hedonism and fun orientation.

Also, there is a demographic revolution in advanced societies due to decreasing birth rates and simultaneously increasing life expectancy. The 'aging of society' is accompanied by the erosion of traditional forms of family life and partnership and the prevalence of one-child families. The women's movement has not only resulted in a growing percentage of women in higher education, but also, although not to the same extent, to mounting numbers of women at work both in economics and in politics. Women can increasingly be found among the working population and among politicians thus challenging the traditional gender roles of the man as the one responsible for earning the money to make a living and of the women as the one responsible for the upbringing of the children and for the household. In terms of socio-cultural development, this has led to a change in the normative structure of society and also a marked increase of 'me-values' echoing the individualization thesis of Ulrich Beck. In addition, the countries we are talking about here live under a democratic imperative, i. e. they are democratic political systems in which there are

checks and balances to prevent an indecent concentration of power in single hands. In democratic societies there is a pressure towards transparency and participation of the public in any issue area as can be seen by the growing pluralization of society.

2.3 Effects on the Military World

The developments and processes in the international and the national dimensions impact on the armed forces. The trend towards liberalization and democratization within the OECD-world and within the NICs, e. g., implies a pressure towards democratization not only in the field of security politics (see Baechler 1989: 27), but also within the armed forces themselves. They are increasingly under pressure to instil democratic norms such as decentralization of decision, participation, relatively thorough flow of information and transparency in the structure of the armed forces. Also, for armed forces living in a „political society“ (Greven 1999) there is a need to be constantly aware that developments within the armed forces become a matter of large-scale public opinion. Moreover, the society or segments of society confront the armed forces with demands for change as can be seen for example by looking at social movements dealing with issues of human rights, ecology, gender, emancipation etc. Most importantly, these movements have put an issue on the agenda of the military which is not easily digested by the armed forces, but instead is a highly contested area. And this refers to questions of social equality reflected in the debate on including women and homosexuals in the armed forces (cf. Soeters/van der Meulen 1999; Miller/Williams 2000). Since global migration is more likely to grow than to shrink over time multicultural societies are developing that face the problem of integrating various ethnic and religious groups and segments of the society into the armed forces (cf. Dreisziger 1990).

As can be seen from this debate, military and civilian discourses may differ and they can also even clash. In this regard, in particular the impact of the value shift – as identified by the sociologists mentioned above – on civil-military relations is substantial because of a growing discrepancy between military and civilian values and value systems. Whereas the former put emphasis on authority, obedience, duty, community, comradeship, discipline, patriotism and giving, the latter stress

individuality, self-fulfillment, autonomy, cosmopolitanism and taking (Wiesendahl 1990; Lippert 1995). In the end, this may result in a trend towards a detachment of the individual from the armed forces.

With regard to the international dimension, the collapse of the East-West-conflict, in most parts of the world, led to a downsizing of the military and expectations ran high concerning a peace dividend and, in some segments, also a marginalization of the military. Though this did not happen the way as some had hoped, there have been cuts in defence expenditures and there has also been a reduction of personnel. And they left an imprint upon soldiers serving in the armed forces in terms of thwarted motivation. Also, the bifurcation of world politics and the complex dialectics between globalization and fragmentation have produced a shift from wars in the classical sense, i. e. inter-state wars, to civil wars. The image and the face of war have changed significantly (van Creveld 1991; Shaw 1991; Holsti 1996; Friedman/Friedman 1998).

In addition, globalization implies that security politics must have a global approach and design. According to Clausewitz, the armed forces function as an instrument of the modern state. They are formed, paid for and utilized in the name of the state's security, primarily but not exclusively for its external security against threats by other states. This *defensive* role is complemented by another one which has gradually lost its legitimacy during the 20th century – the role of attacking another state's territory in order to incorporate it into one's own realm or to gain or exercise hegemony (*aggression*). Towards the end of this century, these traditional roles seem to have lost some of their political relevance – due to globalization. This is the case in some macro-regions of the world, Europe among them. In order to prevent these negative effects and to contain local violence, humanitarian intervention and peacemaking and peacekeeping missions are discussed and conducted. Though not completely new, they are in many respects different from the military roles we usually think of when dealing with modern armed forces. The armed forces are thus far from losing political relevance, while gaining new *political* importance by taking over new and non-traditional roles.

Globalization confronts the actors in international relations with a global scope of potential security threats and also with what can be termed the humanitarian impulse, i. e. the „something must be done factor“ (Dandeker 1998: 579). As a result, a broadening of the range of missions abroad and an increase in the number of missions occurred. To deal with these issues and the ensuing problems, the actors have intensified their efforts to establish multinational military cooperation. As a matter of fact, we are witnessing the multinationalization of the armed forces (Kümmel/Klein 2000) – be it in the framework of the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations or in the context of specific alliances and ad-hoc-coalitions. In this regard, Germany, for example, takes part in various bi-, tri- and multinational forces as can be seen when looking at the German-French Brigade, the German-American Corps, the Eurocorps, the German-Netherlands Corps and the German-Danish-Polish Corps which has just turned into existence. Within this military multinationalization/globalization issues of interoperability, of mutual understanding and of effective military cooperation are central. Of even more importance seems to be that a new sense of the soldier's mission emerges in multinational peacekeeping operations. The soldier is no longer a fighter, a technician or a bureaucrat only, but he increasingly becomes a diplomat, a policeman and a global street worker (von Bredow/Kümmel 1999).

Taken together, these developments underline the assumption of Charles C. Moskos and James Burk (1998: 592) who perceive a transition from the modern mass army and the latemodern large professional army to a postmodern smaller professional military. Moskos/Williams/Segal (2000: 1) also speak of postmodern military and characterize it like this: „The Postmodern military (...) undergoes a loosening of the ties with the nation-state. The basic format shifts toward a volunteer force, more multipurpose in mission, increasingly androgynous in makeup and ethos, and with greater permeability with civilian society.“ Viewed from an international perspective, then, conscription seems to be phasing out. This will be accompanied by a transformation of the military's organizational structures towards more flexible and leaner structures to cope with the challenges of military operations other than war. Though they contain civilian elements, this does not mean that the process of *civilianization* of the armed forces will eventually lead to the dissolution of the essentially military nature of the armed forces which some may fear. On the contrary,

the most sophisticated armed forces of the next decades will be characterized by both military professionalism and the integration of typically civil perceptions and attitudes in their performance. And all of these changes referred to in this section, this may be certain, will have an impact on the state and the character and the future shape of civil-military relations.

This discussion of changes in the international and national context and their effect on the armed forces in general provides the basis for an analysis of civil-military relations in Germany. Such an analysis has to take history, the dimension of time, into consideration. Therefore, to start with, the development of relations between the military and society in Germany after the Second World War will be sketched before turning to an assessment of the situation in recent years.

3 Germany: The Tides of Civil-Military Relations

Both the establishment and the character of the German armed forces (for an overview cf. Bald 1994) cannot be understood without the reference to history and without pointing to the fact that the German military was actively promoting the outbreak of the Second World War and was, in certain parts, heavily involved in the holocaust. After the Second World War, the longing for a comprehensive break with the past was manifest and certain segments of German society indulged into pacifism – like the Japanese –, thus making it difficult for the German government of the time to try to regain the commonly known power attributes of a country acting on the international scene which it were set to achieve.

It was the development of the international macro-constellation that helped the Adenauer Administration. Without the Cold War enfolding and especially without the threat perceptions following the outbreak of the Korean War, the rearmament of Germany as well as the creation of the Bundeswehr in the mid-1950s would not have occurred in such a relatively short period of time. Within German society, these steps were by no means consensually greeted. By contrast, there was a significant social movement, the so-called ‘Without me’-movement that tried to prevent rearmament and the establishment of armed forces. These oppositional forces, however, were

driven to the margins of the political stage because of the anti-communist sentiments prevailing at that time. This implied that the armed forces put up since 1956 with defence as its core mission met quite large-scale approval within society. Also, what was perceived as the communist threat from the East persuaded Germany's partners and allies in the Western European Union (WEU) and in NATO to agree to the establishment of one of the biggest mass armies in Europe.¹

In addition and to a substantial degree, the outlook and the character of the German armed forces helped to win them societal support. In particular, General Wolf Graf von Baudissin has to be named and honored in this regard because it was him who gave the Bundeswehr what was to become its basic philosophy, its corporate identity. His name is inextricably linked to the guiding principles of the Bundeswehr, the concept of *Innere Führung* and its ideal of a citizen in uniform. Essential elements of this concept can already be found in the so-called Himmerod Memorandum of October 1950 which implied an authentic delimitation from the Wehrmacht, underlined the need for armed forces to be embedded in a democratic society and declared its belief in democracy. According to this concept, soldiers may run as candidates for elections and join parties. *Innere Führung* implies that soldiers have fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution and by international human rights standards. Thus, it is required to treat one's comrades in a civilized manner. Also, *Innere Führung* entails the right of the individual soldier to object to orders which are violating the Basic Law and the international human rights codex. Furthermore, the military has been made subject to the constitution and to the Charter of the United Nations. The Defense Minister as a member of government is subject to parliamentary control. The Basic Law, then, tries to establish the political, the democratic control of the armed forces and to secure the compatibility of the military with society. Conscription was instituted with this objective as well. In addition, to secure the rights of the individual soldiers, the German government created the position of the defense commissioner of the German parliament (*Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages*).

¹ Article 24, Paragraph 2 of the German constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) opens the possibility for Germany to participate in a system of collective security. Thus, membership in NATO and WEU was backed by the constitution.

When trying to assess the concept of *Innere Führung*, I take sides with Wilfried von Bredow (2000: 112) who perceives the *Innere Führung* as „one of the most innovative and creative political reforms of the Federal Republic of Germany“. Yet, right from the start the concept was heavily contested with, on the one side, a group of so-called traditionalists arguing against the *Innere Führung* and, on the other side, a group of so-called reformers favouring the *Innere Führung*. Usually, in the literature the second group, that perceived *Innere Führung* as a device to secure the democratic nature of the armed forces, is described as being smaller than the first one. Nevertheless, the *Innere Führung* has been and still is operative. This is due to several reasons. Among them is that this idea found considerable support in German politics and in the German society at large. Moreover, the traditionalists did not constitute a homogeneous group; rather, there were several factions, e. g. one that feared the presumably disastrous effects of this concept on military effectiveness, one that, to differing degrees, did not share the reservations within the concept against military traditions and against the Wehrmacht and one that simply followed a pragmatic or technocratic approach (von Bredow 2000: 115–117).

Significant developments in terms of civil-military relations occurred in the 1960s. During this decade, Germany experienced a fundamental and far-reaching shift in its political culture. It was the younger generation, the students, those who came to be called the ‘1968-ers’, who questioned the older generation with regard to the National Socialist past of Germany and especially with regard to the industrialized way the Germans conducted the extinction of the Jews in Europe. They initiated and achieved nothing less than a democratization of society and of the political system which translated into politics. This impulse towards political participation, towards transparency in a lively public debate could not leave the armed forces unaffected. As a result, in the second half of the 1960s the Bundeswehr experienced some sort of democratization. It was discussed to introduce compulsory higher education for officers as a useful tool in training an enlightened officers’ corps to disseminate greater knowledge of what was going on in society at large among the soldiers of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the German Ministry of Defense established two Bundeswehr universities, one in Hamburg, one in Munich. Accordingly, since the early 1970s, officers in Germany have an academic education and degree thereby serving as an

example of the image of the soldier-scholar. This measure served civil-military relations as well.

However, what was considered to be the best means to prevent the military from moving too far away from society and to ensure close contact between the armed forces and society was compulsory military service. Conscription, to be sure, may also be used by authoritarian and dictatorial political regimes – one has to remember that the Third Reich reintroduced conscription right after the National Socialists took power. Hence, it is difficult to argue that there is a linear, perfect and genuine relationship between the draft and democracy. Nevertheless, since the French Revolution and the *levée en masse* conscription is largely viewed by democratic political systems as one basic, though not perfectly reliable instrument to secure a close relationship between the armed forces and society, preventing an estrangement, an isolation of the military from society. In the 1971/72 White Book of the German Ministry of Defence, e. g., there is reference to conscription and an ensuing identity of the Bundeswehr and German society. Likewise, the view that the German armed forces mirror society is often put forward. Yet, this assumption is only partially correct at best. Women, for example, could not enter the Bundeswehr as soldiers until the mid-1970s and, since then, only a few classifications and trades could be accessed by women. Moreover, the group of conscientious objectors has to be mentioned because this means that those who serve in the military do not even resemble their respective male age cohort as, for example, on the educational dimension.

This right of the individual to be exempt from military service because of conscientious objection and to do a civilian service instead is guaranteed by the Basic Law, in Article 4, Paragraph 3. For many years of the Bundeswehr's history conscientious objection was perceived as something like a second-class service compared to military service. Military service was backed by large majorities of the society and those who turned to conscientious objection were not very well respected by most of the German population and sometimes they were even considered as traitors to the country because they resisted fighting for their country. During the 1970s, however, this situation began to change and the number of men who chose conscientious objection began to rise.

This certainly was a result of domestic developments and in particular an outflow of the push towards democratization by the '1968-ers'. But this was also due to developments in security politics and military strategy because meanwhile massive retaliation had been superseded by flexible response as NATO's strategy. As is quite obvious from the term itself, flexible response implied a certain need to dispose of a wide range of armaments and weapons in order to be capable to respond in a flexible manner to a military move from the most likely enemy, the Warsaw Pact countries. This is the context in which one of the most intense debates on security politics in Germany and in several other Western countries took place. In the mid-1970s Chancellor Helmut Schmidt identified what he called the missile gap in the European theater with the Soviets disposing of more intermediate range missiles than the NATO countries. Accordingly, there emerged a debate within NATO to make up for this gap by deploying American Cruise Missiles and Pershing-II-missiles on European soil. Eventually, NATO decided to do so. This, however, met with unprecedented and large-scale resistance and opposition in Western societies mainly triggered by the fact that Central Europe and Germany in particular would not only be the military theater in a case of an emergency, but also the target of nuclear intermediate range missiles which might not leave a 'Day After'.

As a consequence, and hand in hand with the ecology movement which doubted the use of nuclear energy on ecological grounds, there developed an influential peace movement which not only challenged the government in terms of military strategy by presenting alternative strategies of defence, but began to organize a new party (the Green Party) and took the debate to the streets. Accordingly, in the late 1970s and early 1980s huge demonstrations took place in Germany which also faced severe economic problems. The whole discussion was characterized by extreme polarization and there developed something like a rift in German society. The split even reached the governing Social Democratic Party and tore it apart. Helmut Schmidt lost the backing of considerable parts of his own party that would not want to agree to the deployment of American missiles. The coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Liberal Party (FDP) broke up and Helmut Kohl from the Conservative Party (CDU) came to power in a coalition with the liberals.

In the course of this heated discourse in the late 1970s and early 1980s civil-military relations suffered quite a lot. With pacifist and anti-military sentiments on the rise considerable parts of German society began to draw their back on the armed forces. Barracks, e. g., were blocked by demonstrators and the numbers of conscientious objectors began to rise dramatically. In socio-economic and educational terms, the conscientious objectors were mostly the better educated, those with higher education which implies that this group was disproportionally underrepresented in the Bundeswehr thus questioning the image of the armed forces as being identical with society. Also, and to a certain extent echoing the development just sketched, the Bundeswehr attracted more people with a rightist political opinion than with a leftist political attitude (Kohr 1993). Moreover, and indicating a notable shift in German political culture, the public image of conscientious objection began to change dramatically leading to de facto, but not de jure, equality of conscientious objection with military service.

Although the polarization within German society on the issue area of the military and of military strategy weakened in the second half of the 1980s with the help of the new approach to security politics by Mikail Gorbachev and the INF-Treaty in the mid-1980s, the pattern of conscientious objection and military service did not change. This can be traced back to the value shift referred to above with individualization and post-materialistic values on the rise and with the sensational society developing. Against this background, it is no wonder that the reasons and motives cited for conscientious objection changed substantially. It is no longer simply a matter of conscience to choose conscientious objector status: „Cost-benefit considerations are of primary importance. Many view civilian service as entailing less risk and fewer constraints on freedom.“ (Fleckenstein 2000: 89)

With the collapse of the bipolar international macro-constellation and with German unification, the situation in terms of civil-military relations changed again and it changed in several respects. Due to international change and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Germany was confronted with the task of integrating the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), a huge endeavour both in political, socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions. The Bundeswehr was facing the challenge to integrate the National People's Army (NVA) – at a time when the Bundeswehr was set to reduce

and downsize its personnel and the number of its garrisons substantially (by 30–35 percent each). In the end, only about 10000 soldiers from the 90000 East German professional soldiers of October 2, 1990, were taken over and most of them were reduced in rank. Among the population of the former GDR this was often perceived as West German colonialism leading to reservations against the Westerners – all the more so since payment in the East is far less than in the West: In the new Bundesländer payment is nowadays about 88 % of the payment in the old Bundesländer (Klein/Kuhlmann 2000: 200f.).

The tectonic shift in international relations also implied that, all of a sudden and unexpectedly, the enemy was gone leading to high expectations concerning a new harmonious and peaceful world order in which there is only little room if at all for armed forces and organized violence and in which the United Nations would slowly develop into some kind of world state. However, as it turned out quite soon after the fall of the wall and the Iron Curtain, military conflict stayed with us. The Gulf War that started in spring 1991 and later on the bloodshed on the Balkans put the German government in an awkward position because the German allies expected the Bundeswehr to actively participate in joint military actions. This led to an intense debate in Germany and in the armed forces on the legitimacy of participating in military (combat) missions outside national and alliance borders and within the framework of the United Nations or the OSCE. After a while, the government decided to declare peacekeeping and peaceenforcement operation as well as out-of-area operations to be compatible with the constitution (contribution to international security), but was taken to the courts on this issue. In July 1994, then, the Federal Constitutional Court largely confirmed the government's interpretation of the Basic Law. As a consequence, the Bundeswehr became part of the missions on the Balkans.

Germany has thus accepted what has been termed in this paper the non-traditional roles of the military and has shifted priority to rapid deployment forces. This has been interpreted as Germany's contribution to the management of international relations and as Germany's interest in maintaining international stability and international order and in securing international human rights standards. At the same time, this has been identified as being synonymous with a latent militarization of

German politics. This was the position of the German peace movement at the beginning of the Gulf War, yet, it soon found itself to be on shaky grounds. The human rights violations by Saddam Hussein and later on the acts of ethnical cleansing on the Balkans led to a severe debate in the peace movement and in the Green Party as well with an increasingly numerous part arguing that in certain respect and in certain cases the use of violence were justified whereas the second, smaller group still stuck to strict or radical pacifism. In terms of civil-military relations, this is of considerable importance because it meant nothing less than a more positive attitude towards the military within segments of society that had hitherto cultivated an anti-military sentiment.² A bright future for civil-military relations in Germany, then?

4 The Current State of Civil-Military Relations in Germany

This section tries to give an answer to this question. Here, the TISS project comes into play. The research design and the findings of the TISS project are both well-known and well-documented. In what follows I will pay reference to those parts of the TISS project only where some comparison to the German case is possible (Thereby implicitly arguing for a large-scale comparative approach including a number of countries from all over the world!). This is tantamount to saying that the data basis for a TISS – Germany comparison is quite limited because neither the research sampling nor the research instrument find a comprehensive German match. But, indeed, there is some match at least. These matches are more numerous with regard to the instrument. The questionnaires used in Germany contain some sections which are quite similar to the TISS questionnaire. However, with the sampling, the restraints regarding the comparability of the German data to the TISS-project are more pronounced. Here, neither the civilian nor the military segment in the German case have been differentiated in the way the TISS-group did with identifying an elite civilian public, a elite military, and the mass civilian public (Newcity 2000).

² This is reflected in SOWI opinion polls. Whereas in 1996 the SFOR deployment was viewed positively by only 25 percent of the population, in June 1998 64 percent of the population were in favour of the German deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nevertheless, with all due caution, the data at hand may provide some, though perhaps rather eclectic, insight into the nature of the civil-military gap in the Germany of our times.

To approach the civil-military gap in Germany, I resort to the annual population surveys of the Bundeswehr Institute for Social Sciences (SOWI). They are based on face-to-face interviews and on the random-route selection of respondents. The samples of about 2000–2700 people are representative for German society as a whole. Inter alia, the questionnaire contains sections dealing with things military, foreign policy and domestic issues, i. e. the three thematic meta-sections of the TISS questionnaire. The departure point for an analysis of civil-military relations is that within the sample of the annual population surveys, one usually finds quite a number of people with a military background understood in a fairly broad sense, i. e. having a first-hand, personal experience. As a consequence, it becomes feasible to single out people who either have been in the military – be it in the Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in the National People's Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) or in the Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) of Germany after unification – or who are still serving in the military. This military service either consists or consisted in doing conscription or in serving as a shorter-/longer-service volunteer and as a career servicemember. With these data at hand, it is possible to construct a group consisting of these people thus forming what may be termed the military segment of the German population. All the rest may be considered the civilian segment of German society. In the end, then, it is possible to analyze the differences and the similarities in the opinions and attitudes of these two groups.

Some caveats have to be made: First, it may be questionable to group the conscript soldiers with professional soldiers because conscripts may not be considered as 'real' soldiers since they stay in the military only a few months. Also, by combining conscripts this approach implies a far-reaching definition of the soldier thus enhancing the 'civilian' element in the military segment. Yet, since the Bundeswehr still is a conscript army, this approach seems to be justifiable. Second, this military segment comprises people who served in the military a very long time ago in some cases. Next, it combines people with different military backgrounds since the

Bundeswehr and the NVA belonged to two antagonist military alliances and to two different political systems in terms of ideological, political and economic orientation. The same, however, applies to the civilian segment. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the military segment may not be representative for the military as a whole, for example in terms of services, rank and age composition.

What is perhaps most deplorable in terms of a comparison with the TISS project is the fact that the questionnaire does not allow for a differentiation between officers, non-commissioned officers and rank and file. Also, because of low absolute numbers, the data do not justify the construction of a group which could be termed the active military segment that could be compared to veterans, for example.

With this in mind, I will proceed in the following way: At first, I will briefly sketch the overall development in the three thematic meta-sections for the last few years to put the data in a larger context. This will be done by looking at the importance ascribed to several security dimensions and at the roles the military should play. Next, the civilian and the military segment as of the year 2000 are put to a closer scrutiny. Here, with regard to the three thematic meta-sections, differences and similarities in attitudes and perceptions will be worked out.

4.1 General Developments

The following table shows the importance attached to various fields and dimensions of security by the respondents of the SOWI survey as a whole over the period of the last five years. Overall, the high percentages indicate the generally positive meanings associated with the term security. When comparing the various dimensions of security, notable differences in the relative weight of the dimensions and hence a ranking of the dimensions become clear: The data are proof of the relatively low importance ascribed to military security compared to the other dimensions of security. This is in line with the qualitative analysis of the history and the development of civil-military relations in Germany presented above. There, it was argued, that German society since the mid-1980s came close to Charles Moskos' model of the war-less society (Moskos 1992) in which little thought was given to

security politics in general and military threats and risks in particular. This is reflected in the data for the years 1996–1998 when military security, with a significantly lower percentage, ranked last among the various dimensions of security.

Table 1: Dimensions of Security and Their Importance
(Source: Annual Population Surveys of the SOWI; in percent)

Dimension	1996 N = 2490	1997 N = 2572	1998 N = 2025	1999 N = 2724	2000 N = 2413
Income security	86	86	86	86	85
Social security	86	83	82	85	82
Secure (good) relations in family	84	84	84	86	78
Safety from crime	80	82	82	80	75
Job security	78	80	74	77	74
Secure democratic rights	68	70	72	73	66
Ecological security	69	63	58	64	63
Military security	42	44	47	69	63

Note: The items, for each security dimension, ask the respondents to indicate the weight they personally ascribe to the respective security field and is coded on a seven point scale: 1 is equivalent to *Not important at all*, 7 is equivalent to *Highly important*. The percentages given here are the sum of scale points 6 and 7.

In 1999, however, the data for military security show a tremendous increase from 47 to 69 percent. It did not any longer take the last position, but moved upward to second-last leaving ecological security behind. The reason is, of course, Germany's first post-World War II mission incorporating combat elements in the framework of NATO's operations on the Balkans (KFOR). This confronted German society much more directly with issues of security politics and military operations leading to a greater sensitivity and concern for these topics. In the following year, however, perhaps because of the relative calm of the KFOR mission so far, military security again ranked last in the list of security dimensions.

The debate on Germany's military role in international politics in the wake of the Gulf War and, later on, the manifest participation of the German armed forces in military operations other than war in Bosnia and in Kosovo put the issue of the roles the military and, in particular, the German armed forces can and should play on the agenda. Again, interesting trends and developments can be observed. The following table lists various tasks; the respondents were asked whether they think these tasks should be assigned to the Bundeswehr.

Table 2: Roles the German Armed Forces Should Play
(Source: Annual Population Surveys of the SOWI; in percent)

Military Tasks	1997	1998	1999	2000
Defence of German territory	88	93	95	93
International disaster relief	92	94	94	92
Defence of allies	84	86	85	85
Peacekeeping	77	82	85	83
Peaceenforcement	55	62	64	67

Note: The item is coded on a four point scale: 1 is equivalent to *Yes, of course*; 4 is equivalent to *No, not at all*. The percentages given below are the sum of scale points 1 and 2.

Overall, German society supports both the traditional and the non-traditional roles of the military (von Bredow/Kümmel 1999). Unsurprisingly, acceptance and support for the traditional functions of defence and deterrence is stronger than for the non-traditional functions in military operations other than war. A notable exception to this general rule, however, are missions of international disaster relief. In 1997 and 1998, they have even assumed priority status within German society, i. e. they were even more considered as appropriate roles of the military than the classical defence roles (defending German territory and German allies) which may be taken as a reflection of something which may be called the cosmopolitan impulse of German society. For 1999 and 2000, defending German soil has assumed primacy and the data for international disaster relief have been slightly decreasing. The figures for peacekeeping and peaceenforcement missions also show an increase thus responding to the changing international environment and to the ensuing change in military roles. It has to be noted, however, that peacekeeping is much more supported by

German society than peaceenforcement and comes close to parity with the classical role of defending Germany's allies. Peaceenforcement, by contrast, although supported by the majority of Germans, meets opposition and resistance to military operations involving combat elements.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in the course of the 1990s and in the wake of developments going on in Europe and in other parts of the world, the sense for the idea and the need of peacekeeping has grown and the ideas of humanitarian intervention and of using (military) force to stop the use of military force have been meeting greater sympathy among the Germans. This can be seen, when looking at the government which authorized the participation of the Bundeswehr. Notably, this was done by a red-green coalition consisting of social-democrats and the Green Party, i. e. political parties that both carry strong pacifist segments. In the wake of these developments and shift in attitudes the image of the Bundeswehr within German society became even more positive than it had already been in the past, as the data for the years 1997–1999 given in the table below are proof of. Single events as happened, e. g. in the second half of the 1990s when the Bundeswehr provided disaster relief when there was a huge flooding in the area of the river Oder have also contributed to the peaks in societal sympathy. Albeit, whether this trend is stable, remains to be seen because the figure for the year 2000 shows a small decrease.

Table 3: Individual Attitudes towards the German Armed Forces
(Source: Annual Population Surveys of the SOWI; in percent)

Year	Positive/ rather positive	Negative/ rather negative
1997	76	24
1998	80	20
1999	84	16
2000	80	20

Note: The figures are based on an item which asked the respondents to indicate their general image of the Bundeswehr and which is coded on a four point scale.

4.2 The Civilian Segment and the Military Segment Compared

Having thus sketched the broader context, I now turn to the more detailed analysis of the civil-military gap in present-day Germany. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to give some information on the military segment. As has already been mentioned, there are obvious shortcomings of the data in constructing various groups of the military segment, because this group is a very heterogeneous one comprising past (East and West German) and present conscripts, shorter and longer-service contracts and career servicemembers. As regards the draftees: 39 persons report to be present conscripts, 131 and 338 respectively report to have been conscripts in Eastern and Western Germany respectively. When it comes to the second group consisting of both shorter and longer-service contracts and career servicemembers (the questionnaire groups them together in one single category), there are 33 persons who report to presently belong to this group and 38 and 70 persons respectively who say to have belonged to this group in the NVA and the Bundeswehr respectively. Since multiple responses have been possible and actually occurred in substantial numbers, these numbers cannot simply be added thus making up the number of persons falling into the newly constructed category of the military segment. Indeed, this segment only comprises 509 persons.

In a sociodemographic description this sample turns out to be predominantly male; it includes 33 women only. The oldest person in the group was born in 1905, the youngest in 1984. Birth dates until the end of 1945 are reported by 125 persons, and 122 have been born in the 1970s and 1980s. Religious affiliation is predominantly Christian with 187 protestants and 187 catholics; 129 do not belong to a confession. 140 respondents report to have mainly been growing up in the former GDR or the New Bundesländer. Almost half of the military segment lives in villages and small towns up to 20000 inhabitants; 140 live in cities up to 100000 and 126 in cities with more than 100000 inhabitants. Three out of five persons within the military group are married, 127 are single and 7–9 percent each have a permanent partner or are either divorced or widowed. Lastly, concerning education, 194 respondents have earned a junior high school degree (Hauptschule) and 186 a secondary school degree (Realschule). 88 report a high school degree (Abitur) and 41 studied.

Compared to the civilian segment, there are some interesting differences. The biggest one relates to sex. Whereas only close to 39 percent of the civilian group are male, it is more than 93 percent in the military segment. Next, the respondents with a military background are more often married than those of the civilian group. 58 percent of the military group are married compared to about 38 percent of the civilian segment. In turn, in comparison to the military segment, the percentage of singles among the civilians (36 percent) is more than 10 percent higher. Regarding the place of residence, in both groups the largest sub-group prefers to live in villages and small towns up to 20000 inhabitants. But while the percentage is roughly 38 for the civilians, it is no less than 48 for the military segment. The opposite pattern emerges when it comes to the category of cities with more than 100000 inhabitants. Here, it is 33 percent for the civilians compared to less than 25 percent for the military group. In addition, thereby coming to east-west-differences, 28 percent of the respondents within the military segment report to have mainly be growing up in the GDR or in the New Bundesländer. The percentage for the civilian group is less than that and amounts to 22 percent. For the other sociodemographics mentioned above the two groups are rather similar. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that, although the Christians in both groups make up for some 73 percent, the balance between protestants and catholics is much more equal in the military segment with more than 36 percent for each orientation. By comparison, in the civilian segment, there are 42 percent protestants compared to 31 percent catholics.

Turning to the analysis, in the beginning, I will follow the same path as in the preceeding section, i. e. start with the various dimensions of security and move on to the roles the military should play. Needless to say, the items, the item responses and the scaling are the same as above. Further on, I will specifically look at specific issues of the three thematic meta-sections. To start with the security dimensions, the data are as follows:

Table 4: Dimensions of Security and Their Importance According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

Dimension	Military N = 509	Civilian N = 1872
Income security	84	85
Social security	80	82
Secure (good) relations in family	77	78
Safety from crime	71	76
Job security	80	72
Secure democratic rights	67	66
Ecological security	62	63
Military security	62	63

As can be inferred from the table above, there are almost no significant differences between the civilian and the military segment regarding the importance attached to the various fields of security in general and military security in particular. However, the military segment puts a greater emphasis on the job dimension, whereas the civilian group attaches more weight to the issue of safety from crime. When it comes to the roles of the military, the overall picture again is that of congruence, since overall agreement on defining the roles named as appropriate roles for the military is very high, but a closer look reveals some remarkable differences.

Table 5: Roles the German Armed Forces Should Play According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

Military Tasks	Military	Civilian
Defence of German territory	94	93
Defence of allies	89	84
International disaster relief	89	93
Peacekeeping	83	83
Peaceenforcement	75	65

As can be inferred from these data, the military and the civilian groups are quite similar in opinions on defending German soil and peacekeeping. Significant differences, however, come up on the issues of defending Germany's allies, of international disaster relief and, most particularly, of peaceenforcement. Whereas the civilian group gives international disaster relief prime importance matched only by the item of defending German territory, the military segment places this military task second to the defence of German soil. In turn, the military views the defence of allies and, in particular, peaceenforcement more sympathetic than the civilian segment. This indicates, at least for some kinds of operations, substantial civilian-military incongruence with regard to the use of force, here displayed as a stronger reluctance of the civilian group to use military force. These data resonate with some other findings. Because, in a similar vein, the civilian segment is more critical of the German military participation in the mission in Kosovo and much more critical of a future German military participation in a mission similar to that in Kosovo and entailing air strikes. A strict resistance to such a mission is displayed by more than one third of the civilian segment compared to less than one fourth of the military segment. The differences are also striking when it comes to the operational area. Here, the military group is much more ready to participate in these missions on a global scale than the civilian population.

Table 6: German Participation in NATO Peaceenforcement Missions According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

Should the Bundeswehr participate in military operations by NATO in the future, even if entailing air strikes such as on the Balkans?	Military	Civilian
Yes, on a worldwide scale.	27	18
Yes, but in Europe only.	50	47
No, not at all.	23	35

Taken together, this reveals certain civil-military differences in attitudes on foreign policy and security issues. The military segment does not only attach more weight to military force as a political instrument, but is also more ready and inclined to use military means for foreign policy and security goals whereas the civilian population

is more reserved and reluctant in these questions and more prone to non-military means. Both segments, however, come quite close in the percentages of those who favour a more active role of Germany in international politics. Given the history of civil-military relations described above, this is worth mentioning because this is a shift compared to the past meaning that the civilian population has become more internationally oriented in the course of time.

The analysis also shows some civil-military divergence when it comes to the military itself. It will be no surprise to the reader to read that the general attitude towards the German armed forces is more positive among the military population (84 percent) than among the civilian population (79 percent).³ Also, the military profession is held in significantly higher esteem in the former group than in the latter one with close to 65 percent of the military group holding officers in high esteem compared to 56 percent of the civilian population.⁴ As the following table shows, a similar pattern is revealed when the respondents were asked about their trust in political and societal institutions and indicate their depth of trust or distrust.

³ This item was coded on a four point scale.

⁴ This item is coded on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (*Extremely low esteem*) to 7 (*Extremely high esteem*). The percentages given here are the sum of points 5 to 7.

Table 7: Trust in Institutions According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

Trust in	Military	Civilian
German Armed Forces	56	50
Constitutional Court	55	59
Police	47	54
University	44	48
Parliament	33	36
Churches	29	34
TV	29	31
Unions	26	27
Press	25	28
Government	23	34
Political parties	14	17

Note: This item was coded on a ten point scale ranging from 1 (*Complete trust*) to 10 (*Complete distrust*). To assess for trust, points 1 to 3 of the scale were added.

The general pattern is that the military segment is less trustful towards institutions than the civilian group. The notable exception is, of course, the military. However, it can be observed that the differences between the two groups are not very distinct which may be explained by the predominance of conscripts in the military segment. Given these moderate differences, the items displaying stronger divergence are all the more remarkable. Here, in this list, the military places top priority on the armed forces, i. e. puts the most trust into the Bundeswehr, whereas the civilian population is most trustful of the constitutional court and ranks the armed forces third, following the police. With the TISS findings in mind, it is quite surprising to see that the military and the civilian groups do not differ much regarding their attitudes towards the media. Here, stronger reservations on the side of the military could have been hypothesized.

Compared to the civilian segment, then, the military is considerably less trustful towards the police. Even more pronounced is the lower trust of the military in the government (a red-green coalition of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and

the Green Party) which may, at least partially, be explained by the turbulence within the military produced by the large-scale reform of the Bundeswehr implying cuts in personnel, force restructuring, relocations, reductions in the number of military bases etc. Another additional explanation is civil-military divergence in party political inclination and political orientation, i. e. a topic which has gained a good deal of attention within the TISS project.

Table 8: Party Political Inclination According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

Party	Military	Civilian
Christian-Democratic Union (CDU)	28	27
Christian-Social Union (CSU)	13	8
Social-Democratic Party (SPD)	39	46
Liberal Party (FDP)	8	5
Green Party (Grüne)	4	9
Socialist Party (PDS)	5	4

The figures evidence some civil-military gap in things political. Whereas the military group is more inclined towards the conservative (CDU, CSU) and liberal parties (FDP) and thus towards the center-right sectors of the political spectrum, the civilian group's sympathies lie more on the side of the social democrats (SPD) and the greens (Grüne).

Returning to the data on trust in institutions, it is important to note that within the civilian segment the military does by no means rank at the bottom of the list. Rather, civilian esteem for the military and civilian trust in the armed forces are substantial; in other words, the military is taken for granted and rated high among the 'natural' institutions of a society. This resembles the findings of the TISS project. Yet, approval does not say much about one's personal, individual interest in the Bundeswehr and even less about the individual's willingness to join the military. In trying to answer this question, however, some detours are necessary since an explicit question related to this topic was not posed to all of the respondents. A first avenue to these questions may be to look at the willingness to allocate funds to the military.

Here, the readiness to make sacrifices and thus to invest in the armed forces shows some divergence, but, to be sure, on a high level. As the data given below evidence, the civilian group is more inclined to reduce armaments than the military segment does. Those from the military group who think that defence expenditures should stay the same or should be raised make up for 83 percent compared to 70 percent of the civilian segment. When it comes to reducing the expenditures, almost one third of the civilians agree in comparison to 17 percent of the military group. The percentage of those favouring a reduction, then, is about half of the percentage in the civilian segment. This may also be interpreted as a reflection of a civil-military gap in the perception of appropriate roles for the military and in the respective importance ascribed to military and non-military means of conflict resolution dealt with above.

Table 9: Attitudes Towards Military Expenditures According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

In the future, defence expenditures should	Military	Civilian
Be raised very much.	3	1
Rather be raised.	21	18
Stay the same.	59	51
Rather be reduced.	15	23
Be reduced very much.	2	7

A second avenue may be to look at the attitudes toward the force structure. Germany, in contrast to the large-scale shift towards all-volunteer forces, still operates with compulsory military service for men meaning that each single man is confronted with the draft. Conscription may be resisted by the men through conscientious objection. In such a case, the men will do some civilian service instead, i. e. working in hospitals, social institutions and the like. As has been mentioned already, overall there has been a development in which such alternative civilian services have substantially gained in reputation and image within German society at large. Now, when looking at these issues of compulsory military service and alternative civilian

service from the perspective taken here, it turns out that civilians have a more positive attitude towards conscientious objections and a correspondingly less positive opinion on conscription. With the military segment, this is just the other way round.

Table 10: Attitudes Toward Conscription and Conscientious Objection According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

	Military	Civilian
Conscription is more important than conscientious objection.	21	12
Conscientious objection is more important than conscription.	7	18
Both are equally important.	68	63

With all due caution, these two avenues, the attitudes towards defence expenditures and the attitudes towards compulsory military service, may be taken as indicative of a certain gap between the relatively high general esteem and trust in society with which the Bundeswehr is endowed on the one hand and a relatively low willingness to personally get involved with things military. Again, this finding – which implicitly points to the problem of recruitment – resembles those of the TISS project.

Concerning further things military, and taking up the attention the TISS project paid to minorities in the armed forces, in recent months the issue of integrating women into the military has been discussed in the Bundeswehr and within society. Here, the political decision has been made to open the German armed forces for women in all classifications and trades, starting from January 2001 thus making the German military a bit more representative of German society at large. Asked about this topic, some interesting results surface.

Table 11: Attitudes towards the Integration of Women into the Bundeswehr According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

Depth of Integration	Military	Civilian
Women should not serve in the military at all.	17	23
As in the past, women should only serve in the medical service and in military bands.	34	28
Women should serve in the military in more functions than in the past, but not in combat roles.	26	23
Women should serve in all classifications and trades.	23	26

There is a quite substantial number of people within the military group that are strictly opposed to any integration of women in the military. The figure displayed resonates with a finding of a different study of male soldiers' attitudes towards the opening of the Bundeswehr for women (Kümmel/Biehl 2001). What is more striking, however, is that the percentage for the parallel sub-group within the civilian segment is considerably higher which may be attributable to intervening factors such as age. A similar though less pronounced difference occurs on the last integration model given, the unrestrained opening of the Bundeswehr meaning that women have access to all classifications and trades. By contrast, the percentages of those in the military segment that either want to have the integration process frozen on the status quo or agree to open to a larger degree, but leaving out combat functions is higher than for the civilian segment. Overall, then, the civil-military gap in this dimension is less articulate than might have been expected.

In addition, this topic is also of more general interest because it tells you something on the gender regime in the country. Here, however, more significant differences occur when comparing the civilian and the military segment. The figures below evidence that the military group perceives equality of treatment of the sexes to be given in Germany to a larger extent than the civilian segment which is less sure about this. When it comes to the discrimination of women in the workplace and to affirmative action issues, this pattern of opinion and differences in opinions is repeated.

Table 12: Gender Role Attitudes According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

Item	Military	Civilian
In our society, men and women are treated equally.	51	44
In Germany, workplace discrimination of women does not pose a problem any longer.	50	43
In recent years, women have benefited from affirmative action measures more than they have been entitled to.	34	28

Note: The SOWI survey entailed several items dealing with gender role aspects. These items were coded on a six point scale ranging from 1 (*Do not agree at all*) to 6 (*Do thoroughly agree*). The percentages given in the table are the sum of points 4 to 6, i. e. the points representing agreement.

These data show that the military segment perceives gender role equality to be given to a larger extent than the civilian segment. This may be influenced by the actual process of integrating women into the Bundeswehr, a formerly overwhelmingly male domain. Accordingly, the rationale in this response pattern may be that gender equality must be given if the women are even able to enter a male organization such as the armed forces. However, to this has to be added that the military group views affirmative action programmes more critical than the civilian segment does. Of course, this may be largely attributed to the intervening factor gender which may play a more substantial role within the civilian segment. Nevertheless, it seems that the military group feels to be put at a disadvantage due to affirmative action more than the civilian population does.

Another issue which received considerable attention within the TISS project was the moral, the normative fabric of society. Here, the military turned out to see more of a moral decline of American society than the civilian groups of the TISS sample. However, it seems that this finding cannot be corroborated for Germany. One item may be interpreted in this way because it asks the respondents to indicate their personal threat perceptions, i. e. they are asked whether and to what degree they feel threatened by crime, environmental destruction, wars etc. Among this list of threats, one also finds the loss of guiding values. Although the military segment perceives

the loss of guiding values more as a threat than the civilian group, the actual difference is small. Yet, this proposition has to be amended somewhat because the SOWI data also show marked differences between the military and the civilian segment with the military, for example, attaching more weight to values like the readiness to sacrifice.

Table 13: Moral Decline According to Segments
(Source: Annual Population Survey of the SOWI in the Year 2000; in percent)

The decline of religion and moral implies that people are less willing to risk their lives for the sake of others.	Military	Civilian
Agree completely.	17	14
Agree.	43	39
Do not agree.	25	22
Do not agree at all.	7	8

Within the TISS project, Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi (2000) have addressed yet another topic, one that bears fundamental policy implications. These are the issues of casualties, of casualty shyness/sensitivity/aversion and the questions of a more pronounced casualty shyness among the military than among civilian society on the one and that of different degrees of casualty shyness depending on whether the mission is traditional or non-traditional on the other hand. Yet, given the record of military missions the Bundeswehr has been involved so far, casualties related to combat have been of little concern both to the German armed forces and to the larger German public. This, however, does not mean that casualty sensitivity is a non-issue in Germany.

Table 14: Petitions Filed for Conscientious Objection
(Source: von Bredow 2000: 137)

Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number
1958	2447	1969	14420	1980	54193	1991	150722
1959	3257	1970	19363	1981	58051	1992	133856
1960	5439	1971	27657	1982	59776	1993	130041
1961	3804	1972	33792	1983	68334	1994	125694
1962	4489	1973	35192	1984	43875	1995	160493
1963	3311	1974	34150	1985	53907	1996	156681
1964	2777	1975	32565	1986	58693	1997	155239
1965	3437	1976	40618	1987	62817	1998	171657
1966	4431	1977	69969	1988	77048	1999	173347
1967	5963	1978	39698	1989	77398		
1968	11952	1979	45454	1990	74309		

The number of those young men who chose civilian service as an alternative to military service and, in particular, the growth of this number may partially be interpreted as a sign of an increasing casualty sensitivity in German society. By looking at the data, it is evident that young men have increasingly shown reluctance to enter the German armed forces in the early 1990s and, in addition to the increase due to unification, this can be attributed to the Gulf War and the War on the Balkans. As a result, the issue of a greater international involvement of the Bundeswehr in military operations either under the flag of NATO or the UN and, hence, the issue of a more substantial and personal risk the German soldier is exposed to, emerged on the agenda of the German public. It has to be added, that in the end the German armed forces participated in the missions on the Balkans and that this may give a glue to the TISS finding of the importance of giving meaning, of framing the mission (and thus framing the potential casualties) (Dauber 2000).

5 Conclusion

The TISS-Germany comparison comes to an end here. The analysis was able to show a broad and distinctive overlap of the attitudes of the civilian and the military population in Germany on a wide range of issues belonging to all three of the thematic meta-section, i. e. to foreign policy, things military and domestic politics. *Prima facie*, this could be taken as providing no reasons for concern in terms of a gap in civil-military relations in Germany. A closer inspection, however, provided a more complex picture: Differences, and, at times, remarkable differences between the civilian and the military population could be revealed. These expressions of the civil-military gap were less intense in the field of domestic politics, but more pronounced in issues of foreign policy and things military. No doubt, the analysis is in a preliminary stage so far and, hence, there is need for further more systematic investigation and more detailed analysis of the differences and similarities between the civilian population and those serving in the military. In this undertaking, it may be appropriate to leave out the conscripts in order to have a more ‘pure’ military group. Nevertheless, and with all due caution, it is indeed justified, even at this early stage, to speak of some civil-military gap in Germany.

The question, however, is whether the gap as it is now gives reason for concern and requires action to be taken. This leads to the problem of determining and defining a point at which the gap becomes crucial, precarious, even dangerous. As has been noted by Ole Holsti (2000), the existence of a gap is quite natural since all professional groups, although to differing degrees, develop a certain group culture that is different from that of the general society. According to this, there is a gap between society and lawyers, brokers, nurses, plumbers, physicists, etc. respectively. As a consequence, the gap question becomes a question of the extent and the quality of the gap and of the resources the respective group can command. Although the TISS project has not been able to develop, if possible at all, some kind of a civil-military relations thermometer defining a temperature degree at which civil-military relations turn feverish, Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi (2000) are surely right in arguing that because of the power resources of the armed forces, the military, at all times, deserves heightened attention.

When translating these issues to the German case, the following could be said. In a qualitative assessment, civil-military relations in Germany since the Second World War have been reflecting democratic principles. The democratic, political, civil control of the armed forces has never been endangered although, at times, the relations between the military and society have been strained. With the end of the East-West-conflict and German unification, civil-military relations underwent some significant transformations. They reflect that, for the foreseeable future, and especially in Europe, large-scale inter-state wars seem obsolete, while organized violence and war will stay with us in the 20th century. However, there will be local (though not necessarily locally containable), small, mostly intra-state armed conflicts in which international provisions on the conduct of war will be almost totally neglected as can be seen when looking at the Balkans. Since globalization requires security politics to go global, Germany as one of the major European and thus international actors with an interest in the maintenance of international order has to think about military interventions in the name of international order. Such a perspective has gained more reputation and agreement within society than in the past.

In order to cope with the new non-traditional roles of the military, Germany is actively promoting concepts of international military cooperation and military multinationalism. At the same time, Germany is currently undergoing the most pervasive and comprehensive reform of its armed forces to make the military more flexible, more effective, more compatible with its international partners and more cost-effective, which, *inter alia*, implies a reduction of the 'institutional presence' (Burk 2000) of the Bundeswehr in society. Germany has witnessed nothing less than a transition from armed forces for peace which were never really deployed in missions which required them to really fight to new missions involving an active engagement and participation of the Bundeswehr. Opposition and resistance towards these measures in society are surprisingly limited.

The overall image of and trust in the Bundeswehr is substantial. Yet, the data indicate that the armed forces seem to lose ground in the individual life designs of the people. Here, I basically agree with Charles Moskos saying that the attitude of the public towards post-modern armed forces is marked by indifference. I contend that this is the case for Germany. The Bundeswehr has become an institution which

is seen by large segments of society just like institutions like the church or the police: You have them, and it is ok that they are there, but you do not go there personally if you are not in need. It is nothing that most people really take into consideration for themselves. This leaves the armed forces with a severe problem. Conscription, even in Germany, is on the decline, a professional all-volunteer army looms at the horizon. This poses the question of how to integrate the Bundeswehr in its already changed state and with future transformations to be expected into the democratic society. Part of this is that the Bundeswehr will have to pay its soldiers more and to increase its efforts in expanding its Vocational Advancement Service in order to attract personnel and to compete with the civilian labor market. This also implies the need to sketch an attractive and interesting image of the soldierly role. At the same time, as critics point out, one has to pay attention to preventing a 'Rambo-type', mission-oriented attitude among soldiers from becoming the dominating military culture in Germany. In addition, there are signs indicating that, e. g., with the new missions the concept of *Innere Führung* is increasingly viewed as being outdated. Indeed, there are some segments in the German military following the traditionalist critique of *Innere Führung* who argue this way (cf. for example Bald 2000). Yet, to what extent these apprehensions are warranted is of less importance here; what is more important is that they point to the crucial and, in fact, even growing importance of *Innere Führung* to secure democratic civil-military relations.

As of now, I would say that civil-military relations today are in quite good shape, perhaps in a good shape that has rarely been matched before. But since the non-traditional missions need not be successful and since it might, at times, be difficult if not impossible to follow equal standards, negative reactions to the double standards coming to the fore have to be expected, both in the national as well as in the international arena (Kümmel 1999). Therefore, my feeling is that civil-military relations will become a more strained, although not really contested relationship in the future.

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